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Abstract
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) has increasingly attracted the attention of firms and
stakeholders. The purpose of this study is to examine whether the mediating role of ESG disclosure has
a negative effect on CEO overconfidence and firm risk, especially based on investors' perspectives.
Many studies on ESG disclosure were conducted in Europe and America. Most ESG disclosures are
measured using manual checklist based on annual reports or firm websites. By using panel dataset of
225 manufacturing firms in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand from 20122016 obtained from Thomson Reuters’ ESG score, the research shows that CEO overconfidence has no
negative direct effect on firm risk but the role of ESG disclosure as a mediating variable has a negative
effect on CEO overconfidence and firm risk. CEO overconfidence has a positive effect on ESG disclosure and ESG disclosure has a negative effect on firm risk. CEO with overconfidence characteristics
will make the best decisions to disclose ESG in order to increase firm value and reduce firm risk.
Keywords: CEO overconfidence; ESG Disclosure; and Firm Risk

Abstrak
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) semakin mendapatkan perhatian di antara perusahaan
dan pemangku kepentingan. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji apakah peran mediasi
pengungkapan ESG memiliki pengaruh negatif terhadap CEO overconfidence dan risiko perusahaan,
terutama berdasarkan perspektif investor. Banyak penelitian mengenai pengungkapan ESG hanya
dilakukan di Eropa dan Amerika. Sebagian besar pengungkapan ESG diukur menggunakan daftar ceklist
manual berdasarkan laporan tahunan atau situs web perusahaan. Dengan menggunakan dataset panel
dari 225 perusahaan manufaktur Asia Tenggara di Indonesia, Malaysia, Filipina, Singapura dan
Thailand tahun 2012-2016 yang diperoleh dari skor ESG Thomson Reuters, hasilnya menunjukkan
bahwa CEO overconfidence tidak memiliki pengaruh negatif terhadap risiko perusahaan secara langsung
namun peran pengungkapan ESG sebagai variabel mediasi terhadap pengaruh negatif CEO overconfidence dan risiko perusahaan terbukti. CEO overconfidence memiliki pengaruh positif terhadap
pengungkapan ESG dan pengungkapan ESG memiliki pengaruh negatif terhadap risiko perusahaan.
CEO overconfidence akan memilih keputusan terbaik untuk mengungkapkan ESG sehingga nilai
perusahaan akan meningkat dan mengurangi risiko perusahaan.
Kata Kunci: CEO Overconfidence; Pengungkapan ESG; dan Risiko Perusahaan

INTRODUCTION
Firm risk is the potential loss of firm
value as a result of uncertainty about results
or events in the future (Sassen, et al. 2016).
Risk can also be seen from the perspective

of information risk. One method to reduce
firm risk is to have a confident CEO who
has the ability to lead the company and
make decisions objectively, for example
disclosing voluntary disclosures to reduce
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firm risk. An overconfident CEO tends to
disclose more in order to lower asymmetric
information and reduce information risk.
Also, an overconfident CEO tends to
innovate and invest more in order to get a
higher return under uncertain conditions.
The higher risk faced by a firm will pose a
higher risk for investors. Investors can
analyze firm risk from stock volatility,
whether the firm has a high or low return
volatility. Volatility in stock returns has
many roles in the financial sector, including
for observing the price behaviour of a
financial asset. This behaviour can be observed through standard deviations of the
stock returns in the previous year. Volatility
can be defined as to what extent we can confidently predict value in the future. The decrease of a firm’s return volatility indicates
that the firm has a small level of risk
(Moeller 2011).
Firms will give a benefit to their investors by reducing firm risks. Based on
stakeholder theory, a firm must be able to
provide benefits to its stakeholders. These
benefits can be provided by disclosing
voluntary disclosures because currently investors are more interested in voluntary disclosures which are disclosed by the firm
(Sassen et al. 2016). One of which is the
disclosure of the firm's non-financial performance. The emergence of investors’ interest in non-financial performance due to
current financial performance is less
relevant to be used as a reference in making
decisions to invest because it is less able to
predict future performance. Investors are
currently interested in non-financial performance because this performance can illustrate how corporate governance is, whether
the firm has social and environmental responsibilities. Performance which has become a concern and is being talked about is
related to corporate social performance
(CSP). CSP has been an increasingly important concept used to ensure that a firm
has a positive influence on society,
employees and consumers. Organizational
CSPs are often operationalized and evaluated by environmental, social and

governance disclosures (Bassen and Senkl
2011).
Environmental,
social
and
governance (ESG) disclosures have the
ability to reduce risk so that firms will try to
disclose ESG (Sassen et al. 2016). Firms
that focus on ESG disclosure can avoid the
costs arising in the future because the firm
is considered to be able to prevent the
impact of the damage that will occur.
Through ESG disclosure, investors can see
the transparency of the firm. This can reduce information asymmetry because the
ESG disclosure has provided additional information.
ESG disclosures can reduce firm risk
because of the role of the CEO who is the
key management responsible for the policies made by the firm. One of the
characteristics of CEO is overconfident.
Overconfident CEO is the CEO who tends
to overestimate the firm's performance in
the future (Malmendier and Tate 2005).
CEO overconfidence can affect firm
decisions included in investment policies.
Hirshleifer et al. (2012) found that firm with
an overconfident CEO invested more in
innovation, obtained more patents, and
achieved greater innovative success for the
R&D expenses incurred. The role of CEO
overconfidence is very important for
investor because regarding the decision of
managerial effort, it can reduce information
asymmetry. CEO Overconfidence tend to
disclose voluntary disclosure as a means to
improve information transparency and
strategies (Dhaliwal et al. 2012). An
overconfident CEO has a principle that he
has a managerial discretion to oblige their
actions toward ESG disclosure outcomes
and improve information transparency
(Dhaliwal et al. 2012).
Overall, there are only few studies on
the effect of ESG disclosure on firm risk.
Based on a meta-analytic review of the
effect of ESG disclosure and firm risk, there
were only 18 studies in the US with a relatively small sample within the period of
1978-1995 (Orlitzky and Benjamin 2001).
Most studies focused on firms in North
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American and Europe. Sassen et al. (2016)
found that ESG disclosure is a firm policy
action to reduce firm risk. ESG disclosure is
one of voluntary disclosures that can provide a good signal for investors. This study
aims to examine the effect of ESG disclosure and firm risk, especially in Southeast
Asian countries, which include Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand. The measurement of firm risk is
based on total risk, which is by looking at
the stock returns volatility. Research on
ESG quality is largely based on the ranking
and checklist developed by individuals by
collecting data manually from annual reports or firm websites (Aerts et al. 2008).
This study uses ESG disclosure ratings that
can be obtained from commercial research
data, such as Bloomberg and Thomson
Reuters. Further, previous research has
never examined ESG disclosure as a
mediating variable in the relationship
between CEO overconfidence and firm risk.
Previous research found that CEO overconfidence has an effect on firm risk. So,
this study is also expected CEO
overconfidence will affect firm risk. CEO
overconfidence is also expected to affect
ESG disclosure because CEO overconfidence will make a decision to decrease firm
risk. One of the ways that gaining more
attention now is disclose ESG disclosure.
The existence of CEO overconfidence has
an ability to affect firm risk through their
choice for releasing ESG disclosure.
The main purpose of this study is to
investigate whether CEO overconfidence
has a negative effect on firm risk, and to investigate the effect of ESG disclosure as a
mediating variable on the effect between
CEO overconfidence and firm risk. This
study focuses on information risk. The research data were obtained from Thomson
Reuters databases and financial statements
of manufacturing firms in Southeast Asian
countries, which include Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand within the period of 2012-2016.
Few studies were done from 2012 to 2016
because there was still little research
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examining the Southeast Asian region and
there only a few firms that disclose ESG in
2011 so this study took the sample from
2012. Regulators and exchanges in AsiaPacific markets are showing an increased
interest in promoting ESG integration by
mandating or recommending disclosures so
that research needs to be done regarding
whether ESG disclosures in Southeast
Asian firms in affect the firms’ risk. The relationship between CEO Overconfidence
and ESG disclosure has never been
examined. Therefore, this study aims to
address the issue. By conducting SEM
analysis, the results of the study indicate
that CEO overconfidence has a significant
positive effect on ESG disclosure, ESG disclosure has a significant negative effect on
firm risk, and CEO overconfidence has a
significant negative effect on firm risk indirectly through the mediation of ESG disclosures. However, this study found that CEO
overconfidence has an insignificant
negative effect on firm risk. Previous study
found that CEO Overconfidence has an
effect on firm risk (Aghazadeh et al. 2018;
Galasso et al. Simcoe 2011). This study
proves that there is an indirect effect of
CEO Overconfidence on firm risk through
ESG disclosure. This study contributes to
the literature regarding disclosures of
environment, social, and governance. First,
this study uses ESG disclosure as a
mediating variable. Second, this study uses
CEO variables by measuring the level of
overconfidence in the relationship. Third,
this study uses firms in Southeast Asia as
samples.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Literature Review
Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theory was originally developed by Freeman (1984) as a managerial
instrument. According to Freeman (1984),
stakeholder theory explains that a group of
people or individuals identified can influence the activities of a firm or can be influ
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enced by firm activities. Stakeholder theory
explicitly focuses on the balance of the interests of stakeholders as the main
determinant of firm policy. Stakeholders
have the ability to give punishment or
appreciation to the firm. One way of
evaluating stakeholders is to look at the
firm's social performance and how the firm
is able to meet the demands of various
stakeholders. ESG disclosure reflects the
ability of the executive to compose social
responsibility into profit so that the firm's
risk can be reduced.
Based on stakeholder theory, a firm
must be able to provide benefits to stakeholders. These benefits can be provided by
implementing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs. The existence of the
programs in the firm is expected to improve
the welfare of employees, customers and
local communities. This shows that a high
level of ESG disclosure can encourage a
more stable relationship with the government and financial community (Mcguire et
al. 1988).
Upper-echelon Theory
Upper-echelon theory is the experience, value, and executive personality
that greatly influence the interpretation of a
situation that can influence choices
(Hambrick 2007). With upper-echelon
theory, firms can know that top executives
are the most powerful actors and must be
considered to avoid bias (Hambrick 2007).
Upper-echelon theory states that executive
psychological characteristics can greatly
influence the CEO’s decision-making
process under certain internal or external
conditions (Hambrick and Mason 1984).
CEO becomes a filter between the
dynamics of the environmental situation
and the choice of strategy. CEO plays an
important role in strategic decision making
and resource allocation. In the perspective
of upper-echelon theory, the strategy
chosen by the leader is a reflection of their
values and cognitive. This theory also
shows that age, experience, education,
social background, economic conditions,

and the characteristics of the group in which
he is located are filters when they digest,
analyze, and try to understand the anatomy
of the problem (D. C. Hambrick and Mason
1984).
One characteristic of the CEO is CEO
overconfidence. CEO overconfidence has
the ability to increase stock prices
(Malmendier and Tate 2005). Overconfident CEOs havemany innovations,
patents, and research and development
expenditures so that they can increase the
value of the firm (Galasso and Simcoe
2011). They tend to disclose ESG so that it
can provide benefits and reduce the risks
faced by investors when investing (Sassen
et al. 2016).
Information Asymmetry Theory
Information asymmetry is a condition
when investors have information about the
firm's performance and others do not. One
way the firm can reduce information asymmetry is by disclosing voluntary disclosure
(Petersen and Plenborg 2006). The disclosure is expected to provide equal access for
stakeholders to financial information and
other information from a firm to reduce investment risk and affect the expected level
of return (Dhaliwal et al. 2012).
Petersen and Plenborg (2006) observed that high quality voluntary disclosure can reduce the level of information
asymmetry by reducing the firm's capital
costs. One of the voluntary disclosures is
ESG disclosure. With ESG disclosure, it is
expected that the firm will disclose environmental information to fulfill its social obligations to environmental protection, promote the value of environmental protection
work and strengthen the social supervision
of environmental protection works that the
firm does. ESG disclosure also provides information about the corporate governance
structure so that it can increase transparency. Companies must have good
governance to mitigate risks to firm reputation and fraud. Meanwhile, investors can
pay attention to information about corporate
governance to prevent future losses and re
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duce risk. Through the disclosure of CSR,
the firm is regarded as having a
responsibility to stakeholders and its role in
social activities. Good ESG disclosure can
be associated with good environmental,
social and governance performance so that
it will improve financial performance and
reduce information asymmetry that can reduce risk. In addition, CEO overconfidence
also tends to reveal more information because it is expected to reduce information
asymmetry (Petersen and Plenborg 2006).
Based on the theory of information asymmetry, by disclosing more information, a
firm tends to be able to reduce information
asymmetry so that the firm will be more
liquid and reduce the cost of capital incurred
by investors (Petersen and Plenborg 2006).
Signalling Theory
Signaling theory explains that the
signal given by the manager to reduce information asymmetry that occurs to various
parties related to the firm. In practice, the
quality of each firm is different so that the
signal process is an action taken by top
managers and will not be possible by middle
and lower level managers (Scott 2015).
Companies that can provide good signals
cannot be separated from the CEO's role in
making decisions, one of them is CEO overconfidence because it has good ability to
make corporate decisions so that the signals
given have credibility and can be trusted by
investors and other users. In the literature on
signaling theory, investors have the
assumption that CEO overconfidence can
reduce information risk. Managers will
make a decision to diminish the information
gap with outsiders, and may use other
means to disseminate information, send
good signals to the market, and retain a
good reputation, for example, via CSR
activities (Lys et al. 2015).
According to Jogiyanto (2014), information published by firm is an announcement that gives a signal for investors to
make investment decisions. When the information is announced, market participants
first interpret and analyze the information as
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good news or bad news. If the information
is considered a good signal, investors will
be interested in trading shares, so that the
market will react as reflected by changes in
stock trading volume (Suwardjono 2014).
One type of information issued by firms that
can be a signal to outside parties is voluntary disclosure. One of types of voluntary
disclosures that can provide a good signal
for investors is ESG disclosure (Sassen et
al. 2016). ESG disclosure can provide a
good signal for investors because it can reduce firm risk so that the investors will tend
to invest.
CEO Overconfidence
Overconfidence is a personal characteristic that describes the tendency of individuals to think that they are better than they
really are in ability, judgment, and motivation for success (Hirshleifer et al. 2012).
Overconfident CEO is a CEO who has a
tendency that he has better characteristics in
terms of ability, judgment, skill, and level
of success. Different from CEO overconfidence, CEO Ability is the CEO that has a
skill related to corporate policies involving
investing, financing decisions and executive compensations. The previous literature
describes CEO overconfidence as a CEO's
tendency to disclose more voluntary disclosures (Lys et al. 2015). When an overconfident CEO makes a decision, the CEO will
be influenced by his or her personal characteristics. CEO overconfidence plays an important role in decision making and firm
policy. Based on (Malmendier and Tate
2005), CEO overconfidence measurements
are based on stock options. CEO overconfidence will continually make more choices
than those suggested by the benchmark because they feel that with its ability to keep
the firm's stock price up and believe it will
benefit by holding options.
Environmental, Social, and Governance
ESG Disclosure is an assessment conducted using research data information related to ESG performance by calculating the
weighted average of the three ESG compo
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nents namely environmental, social, and
governance. ESG disclosures can be used
widely in the capital market to describe
formal corporate reporting outside the
financial statements issued, required by the
Accounting Standards. In the Social and
Environment Accounting (SEA) literature
and in public practice, ESG reports refer to
sustainability reports, corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports, global reporting
initiatives (GRI) reports, corporate responsibility reports, corporate social disclosure
(CSD) reports, and triple bottom line (TBL)
reports.
Environmental,
social
and
governance (ESG) disclosure can be seen
based on assessments of financial database
information such as Thomson Reuters.
Thomson Reuters database provides ESG
assessments consisting of ESG scores and
ESG combined scores and elaboration of
environmental, social and governance components. The ESG score assessment by
Thomson Reuters is obtained by calculating
the weighted average of the three main components of ESG's pillars, which are environmental, social, and governance.
The ESG combined score assessment
conducted by Thomson Reuters is an assessment that combines the ESG score with
23 controversies determined by Thomson
Reuters that took place over a year in the
firm. Twenty-three controversies were included in the ESG controversies category
obtained from global media sources with
the aim of reducing the ESG score. The
ESG combined score is calculated by
measuring the weighted average of the ESG
score and ESG controversies per fiscal period. When the firm is not involved in any
controversy, the ESG combined score is
similar to the ESG score. ESG score and
ESG combined score have a minimum
value of 0 and a maximum score of 100.
Firm Risk
Firm risk can be explained as the
potential to lose corporate value as a result
of uncertainty due to future events (Sassen
et al. 2016). From investor perceptions, firm

risk can be seen from market risk, a risk that
arises due to a decrease in the value of an
investment because of movements in
market factors. This study uses total risk
measurement to measure the firm's risk by
measuring stock volatility. The more
volatile the stock is, the firm will be
considered very risky so that risk averse
investors will tend not to invest, but
investors who are risk takers will invest
because they expect to get a large return
(Sassen et al. 2016).
Hypotheses Development
The Effect of CEO overconfidence and
Firm Risk
An overconfident CEO is a CEO who
has a tendency that he has better characteristics in terms of ability, judgment, skill,
and prospects for success. The existence of
an overconfident CEO in the composition of
the firm's directors allegedly will influence
the policies made by the firm. One of the
policies taken by overconfident CEO is
disclosing voluntary disclosure. Many
studies have concluded that an overconfident CEO tends to disclose more to
give signals to market in order to reduce information asymmetry. Petersen and
Plenborg (2006) observed that high quality
voluntary disclosures can reduce the level
of information asymmetry. Not only does it
provide benefits to the firms, CEO overconfidence also provides benefits to investors
because the lower risk of information, the
lower risk for investor will be. Based on
stakeholder theory where the firm must be
able to provide benefits to its stakeholders.
CEO overconfidence will be able to provide
a large rate of return and reduce risk so that
capital costs will be lower (Aghazadeh et al.
2018). CEO overconfidence can also reduce
stock volatility and provide large returns.
An overconfident CEO feels he has more
skills so that he or she can reduce the firm
risk which can be seen from the decline in
stock volatility. Besides, an overconfident
CEO tends to disclose more to give signals
to market so that asymmetric information
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and information risk can be reduced.
Investors will invest to a firm that has an
overconfident CEO in order to decrease risk
for investor.
CEO overconfidence will try to reduce firm risk because when the CEO
makes the wrong decision will have an impact on their careers, besides the CEO overconfidence is also believed to have a lot of
experience so that they will make decisions
based on the experience they have experienced (Chowdhury and Fink 2017).
When a firm is led by an overconfident
CEO, the firm's strategy is often followed
by changes such as expansion, divestment,
or new product development. This is good
news for investors because it can reduce
stock volatility. The overconfident CEO
will try to reduce firm risk because when he
or she makes a wrong decision, it will have
an impact on his or her career. In addition,
the overconfident CEO will be able to disclose more so that information risk will be
lower. By looking at this, investors will tend
to invest because they expect a large return.
So, the hypothesis tested is as follows:
H1: CEO overconfidence has a
negative effect on firm risk.

prove ESG disclosure is to avoid or reduce
the risk of class actions and related financial
fines (Murphy and McGrath 2013). In
addition, an overconfident CEO also sees
ESG factors as very important factors for investors to consider when they want to invest
because investors are more likely to
consider non-financial aspects. Investors,
shareholders, and clients expect greater responsibility and transparency from the firm.
When investors make an investment, they
expect to get high returns so that it can become a reference points and benchmarks
that can be aspired by the firm in an effort
to improve standards in creating stakeholder value. ESG disclosure is expected to
provide equal access to stakeholders to
financial information and other information
from a firm so that it can reduce information
asymmetry that has an impact on the rate of
return (Dhaliwal et al. 2012). A good level
of disclosure is inseparable from the role of
an overconfident CEO in making decisions
to disclose ESG so that ESG disclosure increases. So, the hypothesis tested is as
follows:
H2: CEO overconfidence has a
positive effect on ESG disclosure.

The Effect of CEO overconfidence and
ESG Disclosure
The existence of the CEO in the composition of the firm's directors can influence
the policies taken by the firm. CEOs who
make decisions to disclose more are considered to have overconfidence, especially related to decision making in order to reduce
information risk. Based on the upper
echelon theory, one of the decisions taken
by the CEO is influenced by psychological
aspects. CEO overconfidence has its own
discretion when deciding to make decisions
because CEO overconfidence has the nature
of empathy when looking at it from the perspective of investors, employees, customers, the environment, and other
stakeholders (Waldman and Siegel 2008).
CEO overconfidence plays an important
role in decision making, one of which is in
disclosing ESG. The aim of the firm to im-

The Effect of ESG Disclosure and Firm
Risk
ESG disclosure is a firm policy action
to reduce firm risk (Sassen et al. 2016). This
is because firms that release ESG disclosures will have environmental, social
and governance responsibilities. Based on
stakeholder theory, the existence of ESG
disclosure is to increase welfare for employees, customers, and investors. Firms
that have environmental responsibility can
reduce costs that will occur in the future because the firms will concern with the impact
of environmental damage that will occur
due to exploring resources. In addition,
firms that have good corporate governance
will certainly run well. When a firm releases
ESG disclosure, the level of risk is expected
to decrease (Gramlich and Finster 2013).
Previous research has presented consistent results that there is a negative effect
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between Corporate Social Performance
(CSP) operationalized and evaluated by environmental, social, and governance factors
(Bassen and Senkl 2011) and firm risk
(Sassen et al. 2016). The higher CSP has
the potential to increase shareholder value
by using lower corporate risk and thus
lowering capital costs (Plumlee et al. 2015).
Social performance and, more specifically,
the values associated with external stakeholders (community, customers) seem to be
the most relevant factors in dealing with
firm risks. From an investor’s perspective,
integrating ESG can be a strategy and
overall firm operations in reducing firm risk
(Sassen et al. 2016). These findings imply
that high public visibility influences the
firm's reputation in disclosing ESG to reduce firm risk which can be seen from the
decline in stock volatility. So, the
hypothesis tested is as follows:
H3: ESG disclosure has a negative
effect on firm risk.
The Effect of CEO overconfidence, ESG
Disclosure, and Firm Risk.
Firms that tend to take risks will have
various risk policy options. Among these
policies and strategies is to do voluntary disclosures; one of which is conducting ESG
disclosures. The firm’s decision to make
ESG disclosure is an action that might potentially reduce risk. This is because if the
firm has intended to disclose the firm's performance voluntarily, investors consider it
as good news for them. The investors will
continue to invest and this can reduce the
firm risk in the future. Based on signalling
theory, firms that disclose ESG will give a
good signal for investors because it can reduce the risk of the company so that investors will tend to invest.
The tendency of firms to make big decisions can influence CEO overconfidence,
which is the key in decision making. ESG
disclosure can bridge the firm's stakeholders to be more loyal. High ESG
disclosure is expected to have the potential
to build individual morale so that it can
motivate stakeholders to be more loyal to

the firm. Loyal stakeholders may be less responsive and less sensitive to negative
news, which also results in less financial
risk so as to reduce volatility and market
risk for their respective firm (Sassen et al.
2016). An overconfident CEO understand
the importance of reducing risk for avoiding
management bias and regulatory compliance to avoid penalties so as to motivate
companies to implement various risk reduction strategies, such as environmental,
social and governance (ESG) disclosures, to
avoid or reduce costs in the future. Investors
can see the ability of the overconfident CEO
based on information released by the firm,
which consequently can affect stock
volatility. When there is information that
the firm discloses ESG disclosures, the
news can cause stock volatility to decrease
because of the direct influence of information on the expected return of the investor. In addition, ESG disclosure can change
investor expectations of CEO overconfidence which will have an impact on the decline in stock volatility.
CEO overconfidence must realize that
sometimes strategic decisions may not be
fully driven by economic reasons, but in
many cases, personal characteristics can explain some unwise decisions that can harm
the company (Tang et al. 2016). Therefore,
CEO understands the importance of
reducing risk in relation to avoid management bias and compliance with
regulations to avoid penalties so as to motivate companies to implement various risk
reduction strategies, such as environmental,
social and governance (ESG) disclosure, to
avoid or reduce costs that will happen in the
future. Therefore, CEO overconfidence will
reduce firm risk trough ESG disclosure.
ESG disclosure can help the overconfident CEO’s ability to reduce the firm risk.
ESG disclosure can help the overconfident
CEO in providing firm information. Investors who do not know the role of CEO overconfidence can see when an overconfident
CEO leads a firm, the firm will have good
ESG disclosures. Therefore, the hypothesis
tested:
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H4: CEO overconfidence has a
negative effect on firm risk with
ESG disclosure as a mediating
variable.

Southeast Asia listed on the stock exchange
in 2012-2016 disclosing ESG; (3) firms in
Southeast Asia that reported daily stock returns for the 2012-2016 period.

RESEARCH METHOD

Research Model
This quantitative empirical research
tests SEM analysis with a maximum
likelihood estimator for CEO overconfidence on firm risk and ESG disclosure
as a mediating variable with data software.
This study uses CEO overconfidence as an
independent variable, firm risk as the
dependent variable, and ESG disclosure as
a mediating variable. SIZE, ROA,
VOLROA, LEV, MTB, dividend payment,
GDP, investor protection were used as
control variables for model 1. Besides,
SIZE, ROA, LEV, GDP, and investor
protection were employed as control
variables for model 2. Model 1 used
VOLROA and MTB as control variables
because VOLROA was measured to see
return volatility as a sign of uncertainty and
MTB represents how companies can
survive in the business they are running.
This study used GDP and investor
protection to control different countries that
are used in this study. SIZE, ROA,
VOLROA, LEV, MTB, dividend payment,
GDP, investor protection can reduce firm
risk and tend to disclose voluntary
disclosure.
The regression equation model is as
follows:

Data and Research Sample
The research samples were manufacturing firms in Southeast Asian countries,
which include Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand within
the period of 2012-2016 because there are
only few studies examining the Southeast
Asian region. Second, there is ASEAN
Economic Community program that caused
the interest of foreign investors to invest in
the Southeast Asian region higher. Third,
there are regulators and exchanges in AsiaPacific markets that shows an increased interest in promoting ESG integration by
mandating or recommending disclosures.
Because of that, research needs to be done
regarding whether ESG disclosures in
Southeast Asian firms affect the firm risk.
This study involved manufacturing firms
because firms in Southeast Asia consist of
various industries with varying risk levels
so that this study examines manufacturing
firms because the risks faced by manufacturing companies tend to be the same and
are expected to indicate the firms’ risks
well. Data were collected using secondary
data. The annual reports of Indonesian firms
were downloaded from IDX official website (www.idx.co.id). The annual reports of
firms from other countries were downloaded from the official website of each
firm. Datastream retrieval was also done by
accessing the Economic and Business Data
Center (PDEB) of the Faculty of Economics
and Business, Universitas Indonesia (FEB
UI). This study also used data of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) value and investor
protection from the Worldbank website.
The sample selection used purposive
sampling technique with several criteria
that are determined to suit the research objective. The criteria are: (1) manufacturing
firms in Southeast Asia that are listed on the
exchange; (2) manufacturing firms in

FRit= β0 + β1CEOit + β2ESGit +
β3SIZEit
+
β4ROAit
+
β5VOLROAit + β6LEVit +
β7MTBit + β8DIVit + β9GDPit +
β10INVPit + θj + ʊj + εit....(1)
ESGit= α0 + α1CEOit + α2SIZEit +
α3ROAit + α4LEVit +
α5GDPit + α6INVPit + θj + ʊj
+ εit....(2)
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Where:
FR
CEO
ESG
SIZE
ROA
VOLROA
LEV
MTB
DIV
GDP
INVP
θ
ʊ
ε
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:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Firm Risk
CEO overconfidence
ESG Disclosure
Firm Size
Return on Assets
Volatility of ROA
Debt to Asset Ratio
Market to Book Ratio
Dividend Payment
Gross Domestic Product
Investor Protection
Industry Dummy
Year Dummy
Error term

Research Variables and Variable
Measurements
This study used CEO overconfidence
as an independent variable, firm risk as the
dependent variable, ESG disclosure as a
mediating variable, and SIZE, ROA,
VOLROA, LEV, MTB, dividend payment,
GDP, investor protection as control
variables.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable in this study
is firm risk. Firm risk variable is seen from
the investors' perceptions by measuring
market-based risk obtained from the total
risk by measuring the volatility of stock
returns for 12 months in the fiscal year, that
is the standard deviation of the stock log
return in the fiscal year for 12 months using
a model from Sassen et al. (2016). This
study used total risk because measuring
total risk can reflect the overall risk.
Independent Variable
The independent variable in this study
is CEO overconfidence. CEO overconfidence variables are obtained from the
CEO overconfidence level, that is CEO who
tends to overestimate investment because
CEO who has overconfidence will be
confident to invest more in innovation.
CEO overconfidence also has the success
rate of obtaining more patents and
achieving greater innovative success for the
R&D expenses incurred so as to increase

firm value and reduce firm risk (Hirshleifer
et al. 2012). CEO overconfidence is
measured using the research model of
Kouaib and Jarboui (2016) by using excess
investment, namely the residual value of the
regression of total asset growth with sales
growth, then measured by a dummy
variable; 1 if the value of excess investment
is greater than the median value of the
industry for one year , and 0 otherwise.
Based on Kouaib & Jarboui (2016), CEO
overconfidence has the ability to make investments that exceed the growth of its
operations so that in the future it will have
higher growth by measuring industryadjusted excess investment, that is the
residual value of the regression of total asset
growth on sales growth will be greater than
the industry median. This study conducted
panel data regression on total asset growth
with sales growth per year period in all
sample countries to obtain residual value.
So, it becomes the limitation of the study
because CEO overconfidence measurement, based on all samples, does not
measure each country to compare residual
values from regression total asset growth
and total sales growth. After the residual
value is obtained, the next step was to find
the median value of the industry from the
residual value of total asset growth with
sales growth per year period in all sample
countries to be compared with the firm's
residual value. To obtain CEO overconfidence data, this study measured
dummy variables by looking at the firm's
residual value greater than the median value
of the industry. If the residual value is
greater than the median value of the
industry, the CEO is considered overconfident, given a value of 1. On the other
hand, if the residual value is smaller than the
median value of the industry, the CEO is
considered not overconfident, given a value
of 0.
Mediating Variable
The mediating variable in this study is
ESG disclosure. ESG disclosure variable
was obtained from the ESG combined score
from Thomson Reuters Eikon. This study
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uses Thomson Reuters' ESG combined
score because the ESG combined score has
been designed transparently and objectively
to measure ESG's performance, commitment and effectiveness in 10 main themes
(emissions, environmental product innovation, human rights, shareholders, etc.)
based on information reported by firms.
This study uses an ESG combined score,
which is the ESG score combined with ESG
controversies, which is calculated further by
discounting the ESG score for news
controversies that materially affect the firm.
If the firm has ESG controversies, it can
reduce the ESG score and if the firm does
not have ESG controversies, then the ESG
combined score is similar to the ESG score.
The maximum and minimum values that
can be obtained from the ESG score are 100
and 0. The ESG score obtained from
Thomson Reuters was calculated and
available for all companies and the
historical fiscal period in ESG Global
Coverage. In other words, the ESG score is
available again in fiscal 2002 for around
1,000 companies, especially the US and
Europe (Eikon 2017). The ESG score
assessment at Thomson Reuters can also
provide descriptions of the 3 components of
the ESG pillar, which are environmental,
social, and governance. The environmental
consists of resource use, emissions, and
innovation. The social consists of
workforce, human rights, community, and
product responsibility. Meanwhile, the
governance consists of management,
shareholders, and CSR strategy.
Control Variables
This research used samples in the
Southeast Asian region. The samples
consist of several countries, which are
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand. Therefore, to
control the state level, a control variable
consisting of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) and investor protection (Wardhani
2009) is needed. In addition, it is because a
diverse industry in a country also requires
variables to control the industry and the year
using industrial dummy variables and years
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Control variables of ESG disclosure consist
of five variables, namely:
Size
The size control variable is the size of
the firm measured based on the natural
logarithm of the firm's total assets. This firm
size variable follows a study conducted by
McCarthy et al. (2017) with the argument
that large firms tend to have corporate social
responsibility (CSR) activities so that they
have an assessment related to ESG
disclosures.
Profitability
Profitability is a determinant that is
often tested in research related to ESG.
Profitability is measured by return on assets
(ROA), following a study conducted by
McCarthy et al. (2017) with the argument
that high profitability can provide resources
to firms so that they can have a higher
tendency to engage in corporate social
responsibility (CSR) activities and have
good corporate governance.
Leverage
Leverage is measured by a debt to
total assets ratio (DAR). Based on research
conducted by McCarthy et al. (2017), firm
with high leverage will have incentives to
disclose CSR and sustainability reporting so
that they have a good impact on the firm's
social performance.
Gross Domestic Product
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is one
of the variables needed to control a country.
The indicator used to determine a country's
economic growth is GDP so that
information about GDP is expected to
describe a country. GDP is the total value of
the production of goods and services within
a country for one year. This GDP
calculation includes profits and income
generated by non-residents and foreign
companies in the country, but not including
residents and companies from the countries
concerned in other countries. Therefore, the
high GDP is expected to increase ESG
disclosure. Measurement of the GDP
variable is done by measuring the natural
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logarithm of GDP per capita obtained from
Worldbank
Investor Protection
Investor protection is also one
variable that is used to control a country.
Investors protection in each country is
different so that they are expected to
provide information about the countries’
governance level. Data for investor
protection measurement are obtained from
Worldbank. From investor protection, it is
expected that decisions taken by the
executives can provide benefits to the
stockholders. One of the decisions taken is
to reveal ESG more. Control variables of
firm risk consist of eight variables, namely:
Size
The size control variable is the size of
the firm which is measured based on the log
of total assets of the firm. The size variable
follows a study conducted by Sassen et al.
(2016) with the argument that large
companies tend to have assessments related
to ESG. Meanwhile, large companies can
also reduce firm risk (Sirsat and Sirsat
2016).
Profitability
Profitability is a determinant that is
often tested in research on ESG and firm
risk. Profitability is proxied by return on
assets (ROA). High profitability can
increase a firm's ability to carry out social
activities and have good corporate
governance so that ESG assessment will
tend to be good and can reduce firm risk.
VOLROA
VOLROA control variable is the
volatility of ROA obtained from the
standard deviation of ROA for 5 years.
ROA volatility is measured to see return
volatility as a sign of uncertainty. ROA
volatility has a positive influence on firm
risk because investors see ROA volatility as
bad news for investors. So, investors tend
not to invest.
Leverage

Leverage is measured by debt to asset
ratio obtained from total debt divided by
total asset. Firm with high leverage will
have incentives to disclose CSR and
sustainability reporting. Thus, they have a
good impact on the firm's social performance. This can be due to pressure and
encouragement from funders so that the
firm will have a good ESG assessment and
can reduce the firm's risk. In addition, high
leverage is assumed by the firm to have a
project that is expected to provide benefits
in the future so that it can reduce risk.
Market to Book Ratio
A high capitalization value illustrates
that a firm has a good performance. Book
value indicates how companies can survive
in the business they are running, so that the
higher the market to book ratio can reduce
the risk of the firm (Aghazadeh et al. 2018).
Dividend Payment
Dividend payment is measured by
calculating dividend per share divided by
earnings per share. Dividend payment is the
one investors expect when investing in a
firm. Dividend payments can reduce the
firm's risk because investors will continue
to invest and the investors also believe the
firm will pay dividends in the next period.
Gross Domestic Product
Gross Domestic Product is measured
by natural logarithm of GDP per capita. To
control risk in a country, this study used
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). With the
high GDP, the value of the welfare of a
country is also considered high and is
expected to reduce the risk of the firm.
Investor Protection
Data of investor protection were
obtained from data of each country from
worldbank. To control risk in a country, this
study also used Investor Protection. Investor protection is expected to reduce the firm
risk by looking at the volatility of the stock
that is down because investors feel safe
when investing. The operationalization of
variables can be seen in Table 1.
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Table 1
Operasionalization of Variables
Variable
Firm Risk

Definition of Operasionalization
standard deviation of the year stock return for 12 months from April to
March
dummy variable, 1 if the value of excess investment (residual value
from regression total asset growth and sales growth) is greater than the
median industry value for one year, and 0 otherwise
ESG combined score from Thomson Reuters database
Natural logarithm Total Assets
Net Income
Total Assets
Standard deviation from ROA for 5 years
Total Debt
Total Assets
Market Capitalization
Total Book Value
Dividend per Share
Earnings per Share
Natural logarithm of GDP per capita
Investor Protection for each country from worldbank data
Dummy industry, 1 for industrial companies, and 0 for others.
Consumer discretionary as a reference industry
Dummy year, 1 for firm observation year. 2012 is the reference year

CEO overconfidence

ESG
SIZE
ROA
VOLROA
LEV
Market to Book Ratio
Dividend Payment
GDP
INVP
Θ
ʊ

Table 2
Goodness of Fit Analysis
Fit statistics

Value

Category

p > chi2

0.000

p>chi2 < 0.05

CFI

0.248

CFI > 0.90

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Goodness of Fit Analysis
This study used the SEM model to
obtain an unbiased conclusion and fulfill the
model feasibility test. The Goodness of Fit
test was carried out as described in table 2.
As table 2 indicates, the research
model in the study is good and is in accordance with the data because the value of p>
<0.05 is 0.000. In addition, the CFI test
shows that the results of this study can perform well even when the sample size is
small.
Descriptive Statistics
This study only involved five
countries, consisting of Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand because only such countries

disclose ESG. The results of sample
collection are presented in the table.
As table 3 shows, only a few
manufacturing firms revealed ESG, which
are 85 firms (12%). This research was
conducted from 2012 to 2016 using
balanced data so that it must reduce.
As table 3 shows, only a few
manufacturing firms revealed ESG, which
are 85 firms (12%). This research was
conducted from 2012 to 2016 using
balanced data so that it must reduce
incomplete firm samples in revealing 5-year
ESG scores consisting of 10 companies
(11%). In addition to achieving the research
criteria, this study filtered out outliers and
incomplete financial data, such as
manufacturing companies whose shares are
not active. Therefore, the final samples
obtained
were
225
manufacturing
companies for 5 years.
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Tabel 3
Data Collection
Criteria

ID

MY

PH

SG

TH

Manufacture firms in Southeast Asia
148
111
79
34
328
Manufacture firms that disclose ESG
19
25
12
13
16
Manufacture firms that have incomplete
(2)
(4)
(4)
data of ESG score for 5 years
Manufacture firms that have incomplete
(7)
(7)
(7)
(7)
(2)
data in financial data
Total Sample
10
14
5
6
10
Total observation (5 years)
50
70
25
30
50
ID: Indonesia; MY: Malaysia; PH: Filipina; SG: Singapura; dan TH: Thailand

Total
700
85
(10)
(30)
45
225

Table 4
Descriptive Statistics of CEO overconfidence
Variable

Total

Dummy = 0

Dummy =1

CEO
225
122
103
ESG
46.47
50.96
SIZE
22.51
22.57
LEV
0.25
0.29
CEO: CEO overconfidence; ESG: ESG Disclosure; SIZE: Firm
Size; LEV: Debt Asset Ratio
Source: Prepared authors (2018)

Table 4 presents a descriptive analysis
of the CEO overconfidence variable. From
the total sample of 225 firms, 122 firms
have CEO who are not overconfident,
indicating that in manufacturing firms in
Southeast Asia, CEOs tend not to be
overconfident. Overconfident CEOs have a
higher ESG disclosure score, a larger firm
size, and a greater level of debt asset ratio
than those who are not confident. This
shows that CEO overconfidence plays an
important role in providing signal to market
by disclosing ESG which reduces the firm's
information risk. The size of the firm is also
a determining factor of CEO having the
nature of overconfident because large firms
tend to have large assets. In addition, overconfident CEOs also have a high debt asset
ratio because they believe that in the future
they can pay off their obligations by making
innovations and investments. Based on the
research data, it can be concluded that the
country that has the most CEO
overconfidence is Indonesia with 29
companies, Thailand has 26 companies,
Malaysia has 23 companies, the Philippines

has 15 companies, and the least is Singapore
with 10 companies.
Table 5 presents a descriptive analysis
of the variables used in the study, including
ESG disclosure, firm risk and control
variables. According to descriptive
statistics conducted on ESG scores, the
average ESG score revealed by firms tends
to be high. However, ESG disclosure is still
very low with a minimum value of 14.9717.
This may be because the samples of this
study only include companies classified as
not disclosing mandatory ESG but the
voluntary one. Based on the data, the
minimum ESG score occurred in 2012 and
the maximum value of ESG score occurred
in 2015 were obtained. So, it can be
concluded that the firm is trying to express
non-financial performance even better. The
firm's average risk is 0.0116 with a
minimum value of 0.000068 and a
maximum of 0.0582 which indicates that
the risks of manufacturing firms in
Southeast Asia tend to vary. This may be
due to the different risk levels of each
country.
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Table 5
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Mean

Median

SD

Min

Max

ESG
48.5310
46.8775
15.8889
14.9717
87.1631
Firm Risk
0.0116
0.0090
0.0103
0.000068
0.0582
SIZE (in USD)
175010225
133516610
4944729615
480982.942
3357353361
ROA
0.1149
0.0882
0.1111
-0.0549
0.5644
VOLROA
0.0505
0.0319
0.0635
0.0001
0.4960
LEV
0.2737
0.2728
0.1473
0.0064
0.6053
MTB
2.2244
2.004
1.3916
0.2162
7.8543
DIVPAYMENT
0.0229
0.0224
0.0194
0
0.1029
GDP
12505.9659
5941.8407
16164.8407
2581.8185
56336.0723
INVP
7.2728
7.7
1.3971
4
9.3
ESG: ESG Disclosure; Firm Risk: Firm Risk; CEO: CEO overconfidence; SIZE: Firm Size; ROA:
Return on Assets; VOLROA: Volatility of ROA; LEV: Debt Asset Ratio; MTB: Market to Book
Ratio; Div Payment: Dividend Payment; GDP: Gross Domestic Product; INVP: Investor Protection
Source: Prepared authors (2018)

Empirical Results
The results of empirical research can
be seen in Table 6 which evaluates the
results of SEM analysis on each variable
hypothesized in this study. Based on Table
6, the results support hypotheses 3 and 4
which show that ESG disclosure has a
negative effect on firm risk and CEO
overconfidence has a negative effect on
firm risk, which is mediated by ESG
disclosures. However, this study does not
support hypothesis 1 because the result is
not significant, that CEO overconfidence
has a negative effect to firm risk. This study
also supports hypothesis 2 which can be
seen in model 2 showing that CEO
overconfidence has a positive effect on ESG
disclosure.
Results Analysis

irrational decisions that occur under certain
conditions of uncertainty and risk (Pak and
Mahmood 2015). In an uncertain condition,
biased overconfident CEOs tend to make
decisions different from usual decisions.
The results of this study are in line with
financial behavior which analyzes the effect
of psychology on investors and its impact
on the market. Investors in the decisionmaking process show irrational. So, investors are able to make wrong decisions or
improper analysis. Biased investors tend to
make decisions different from usual decisions they make when investors see the firm
has an overconfident CEO who will
disclose more and reduce firm risk;
however, biased investors have their own
decisions and cause systematic errors (Im
and Oh 2016).

CEO overconfidence and Firm Risk
From the results of testing hypothesis
1, it can be concluded that this study does
not support the negative effect of CEO overconfidence on firm risk. This finding provides evidence that firm risk is affected by
behavioral managerial biases (Adam et al.
2015). Behavioral managerial biases have
been shown to affect corporate decisions.
CEO Overconfidence bias can cause
distortions in corporate decisions. Overconfident CEOs make decisions based on

CEO overconfidence and ESG Disclosure
From the results of testing hypothesis
2, it can be concluded that the positive effect
of CEO overconfidence to ESG disclosures
was supported. This finding supports the research of Petrenko et al. (2016) which found
that CEO overconfidence has a positive
effect on ESG disclosure. Overconfident
CEOs will try to improve the firm performance so that the decision in revealing firm
performance, especially its non-financial
performance such as ESG disclosure will
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Table 6
Regression Analysis Results

Variable
Direct effect
CEO
ESG
SIZE
ROA
VOLROA
LEV
MTB
Div Payment
GDP
INVP
Cons
Indirect Effect
CEO Mediate by
ESG
INDUSTRY
YEAR
Obs
R2 overall
Prob

FRit= β0 + β1CEOit + β2ESGit +
β3SIZEit + β4ROAit + β5VOLROAit +
β6LEVit + β7MTBit + β8DIVit +
β9GDPit + β10INVPit + θj + ʊj + εit

ESGit= α0 + α1CEOit + α2SIZEit +
α3ROAit + α4LEVit + εit

Dependent Variable: Firm Risk
Predict
Coef
Prob

Dependent Variable: ESG
Predict
Coef
Prob

?

-0.00067
-0.00012
0.00003
-0.00354
0.00309
0.00006
-0.00050
0.10055
0.00612
-0.00183
0.02801

0.312
0.006***
0.485
0.31
0.395
0.495
0.181
0.04***
0.328
0.010*
0.122

+

4.473846

0.017**

+
+

0.551582
-13.6383

0.328
0.077

+

20.21635

0.004***

?

8.327363
0.784443
13.101

0.321
0.255
0.341

-0.00055
-

0.05**
Yes
yes

yes
yes

225
0.2044
0.0000 ***
***significant 1%; **significant 5%; *significant 10%
ESG: ESG Disclosure; Firm Risk: Firm Risk; CEO: CEO overconfidence; SIZE: Firm Size; ROA: Return
on Assets; VOLROA: Volatility of ROA; LEV: Debt Asset Ratio; MTB: Market to Book Ratio; Div
Payment: Dividend Payment; GDP: Gross Domestic Product; INVP: Investor Protection
Source: Prepared authors (2018)

continue to be carried out because investors
prefer to analyze the non-financial performance of the firm. When the firm has
revealed its non-financial performance,
investors consider that the firm has a good
reputation so that investors will continue to
invest and can increase the value of the firm.
Based on upper echelon theory, the
decision taken by the CEO is influenced by
psychological aspects. Overconfident CEOs
have their own discretion making decisions
because they have empathy when looking at
it from the perspective of investors,
employees, customers, the environment,
and other stakeholders (Waldman and
Siegel 2008). A good level of disclosure is
inseparable from the role of overconfident
CEOs in making decisions to disclose ESG
so that it can increase ESG disclosure. The
existence of CEO overconfidence in the
composition of the firm directors is ex-

pected to influence the policies taken by the
firm. CEO overconfidence plays an important role in decision making; one of
which is in disclosing ESG. The aim of the
firm to improve ESG disclosure is to avoid
or reduce the risk of class actions and related financial fines (Murphy and McGrath
2013). In addition, overconfident CEOs
also see ESG disclosure as a very important
factor for investors to consider when they
want to invest because investors are more
likely to consider non-financial aspects.
ESG disclosure is expected to provide
stakeholders with equal access to financial
information and other information from a
firm so as to reduce information asymmetry
that affects the level of return (Dhaliwal et
al. 2012). Investors and clients expect
greater responsibility and transparency
from the firm so that when investors invest,
they will get big returns.
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ESG Disclosure and Firm Risk
From the results of testing hypothesis
3, it can be concluded that the effect of ESG
disclosure on firm risk was supported. This
finding supports research by Sassen et al.
(2016) which found that ESG disclosure has
a negative effect on firm risk. It can be seen
that the greater the ESG disclosure, the
smaller the stock returns volatility is.
Through ESG disclosures carried out by the
firm, investors see the firm has made an
effort to reduce the impact of environmental
damage as a form of social responsibility
and good governance so that it can reduce
costs that will arise in the future and can
help the firm reduce risk.
Based on stakeholder theory, the
existence of ESG disclosures is carried out
to meet the needs of various stakeholders so
as to improve the welfare of employees,
customers, communities and investors. In
addition, the high level of Corporate social
performance (CSP) can reduce financial
risk because high CSP levels can encourage
more stable relationships with the government and financial community (Mcguire et
al. 1988). Thus, a higher CSP has the
potential to increase shareholder value by
reducing firm risk so that it can reduce
capital costs (Plumlee et al. 2015). Social
performance and, more specifically, the
values associated with external stakeholders
(community, customers) seem to be the
most relevant factor in the efforts to reduce
firm risk so that CSR programs are very important to be carried out by the firm.
Some previous studies also prove that
non-financial performance disclosures can
reduce firm risk. Gramlich and Finster
(2013) found that sustainability reporting
disclosure can reduce the level of risk.
Bouslah et al. (2013) also found that
employee relations, corporate governance
and society negatively affect firm risk. With
the disclosure of non-financial performance, the firm ensures that sustainability
issues and non-financial information are
fully available so that the firm carries out
the role of being socially responsible and is
expected to reduce firm risk. In addition,
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because information is fully available, the
description of the firm performance becomes more transparent so that it can reduce
information asymmetry and firm risk.
CEO overconfidence, ESG Disclosure,
and Firm Risk
From the results of testing hypothesis
4, it can be concluded that the indirect effect
of ESG on CEO overconfidence and firm
risk was supported. It can be interpreted that
ESG disclosure can help overconfident
CEOs’ ability to reduce firm risk. The
existence of ESG disclosure can help the
overconfident CEOs’ role in providing firm
information. Investors who do not know the
role of an overconfident CEO can see that
when the CEO leads a firm, the firm has
good ESG disclosures. In addition, with
ESG disclosure, the overconfident CEOs
take more decisions that can reduce firm
risk. The decision that overconfident CEOs
can take is to disclose ESG because it is
considered as a policy choice and the best
action to reduce firm risk. When a firm has
disclosed voluntary disclosures, which are
disclosures about non-financial performance, investors consider it to be good
news. So, they will continue to invest and
this can reduce firm risk in the future.
ESG disclosure can bridge the firm's
stakeholders to be more loyal. Based on
signaling theory, one type of information
issued by a firm that can be a signal to outside parties is disclose voluntary disclosures. One of the voluntary disclosures that
can provide a good signal for investors is
ESG disclosure (Sassen et al. 2016). ESG
disclosure can provide a good signal for investors because it can reduce firm risk so
that investors will tend to invest. In addition, investors will also react when the firm
is led by an overconfident CEO because it
is good news. The overconfident CEO will
tend to disclose ESG because he or she
views ESG disclosures as important to the
business so that it can reduce stock volatility
and consequently will receive support from
stakeholders. The existence of ESG disclosure can help the overconfident CEO to
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Table 7
Regression Analysis Results
Variable
Indirect effect
CEO mediate by Environmental
CEO mediate by Social
CEO mediate by Governance
Source: Prepared authors (2018)

provide more information to stakeholders
so that there is no information asymmetry
and stock volatility can be reduced.
It can be concluded from this study
that investors cannot see the role of CEO
overconfidence directly but investors will
look for signals by looking at whether the
firm discloses ESG or not. An overconfident CEO understands the importance of
decision making to reduce stock volatility
and to avoid information asymmetry.
Therefore, an overconfident CEO will implement a strategy to reduce risk by
disclosing voluntary disclosures namely
ESG disclosures.
Control Variable Analysis
From the results of testing hypothesis
2, it can be concluded that control variables
for SIZE and DER have a positive effect on
ESG. However, ROA has a negative effect
on ESG. This study was not supported
Petrenko et al. (2016) because the results of
testing control variables in that study are
having a positive effect. With high profitability, companies tend to make a lot of
investments so that they may override ESG
disclosures (Sassen et al. 2016).
From the results of testing hypothesis
1, 3, and 4, based on table 6, it can be concluded that ROA, MTB, and INVP have a
negative effect on firm risk. However,
SIZE, VOLROA, DER, DIV PAYMENT,
GDP have a positive effect on firm risk.
Large companies are considered to increase
firm risk because large companies tend to
innovate even though the innovation in the
future will succeed or not (Sirsat and Sirsat
2016). High profitability is considered to be
able to increase the company's ability to
conduct social activities and have good cor-

Dependent Variable: Firm Risk
Predict
Coef
Prob
-

-0.000460
-0.000264
-0.000206

0.070*
0.138
0.154

porate governance so that the ESG disclosure will tend to be good and can reduce
firm risk. When ROA volatility is high, investors will see this as bad news, so investors tend not to want to invest. A high level
of debt is considered by investors as a sign
that the company has a high risk because it
is feared that the company will not be able
to pay off its debts in the future. With the
high capitalization value of the company,
investors assume that they will get a large
profit in the future so that it can reduce firm
risk (Aghazadeh et al. 2018). Dividend
payments provided by companies may not
have much impact on investors because investors can still get capital gains. The
existence of GDP can be a reference for a
company to run its business, when GDP is
high, investors see the company has a high
risk may be due to intense competition between companies. Investor Protection can
reduce company risk because investors feel
safe when investing.
Additional Analysis
Additional analysis tests are needed to
analyze ESG measurements based on ESG
scores for each component, namely
environmental, social, and governance.
Measurement based on environmental,
social, and governance is only to measure
the mediating role of ESG disclosure alone.
The consideration for analyzing additional
analysis is to see what com-ponents most
influence the mediating role of ESG disclosure. Additional analysis results can be seen
in Table 7.
As Table 7 indicates, the mediating
role of ESG disclosure is only seen in the
environmental component. This is probably
because most firms that report ESG in the
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Southeast Asia Region are companies that
are engaged in the mining, coal, and oil industries so that many firms are more concerned with their environmental responsibility. The firms will avoid environmental
damage caused by exploitation of resources,
greenhouse effect, excessive consumption
of water and electricity to avoid costs that
will arise in the future.
CONCLUSIONS
This study aims to examine the effect
of CEO overconfidence on firm risk, and
see the effect of ESG disclosure as a mediating variable on the effect between CEO
overconfidence and firm risk. Based on the
research conducted with a sample of 225
manufacturing firms in Southeast Asian
countries, which include Indonesia,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and
Thailand within the 2012-2016 research
period, this study reveals that CEO overconfidence has a significant positive effect
on ESG disclosure, ESG disclosure has a
significant negative effect on firm risk, and
CEO overconfidence has a significant
negative effect on firm risk indirectly mediated by ESG disclosures. However, this
study also found that CEO overconfidence
does not affect firm risk seen from
insignificant results of the negative effect of
CEO overconfidence on firm risk directly.
Investors cannot see the role of CEO overconfidence directly but they will look for
signals by looking whether or not the firm
releases ESG disclosures. An overconfident
CEO understands the importance of decision making to reduce stock volatility and
avoid information asymmetry. Therefore,
the CEO will implement a strategy to reduce
risk by disclosing voluntary disclosures
namely ESG disclosures.
This research has implications that
can become suggestions for several related
parties. First, investors can use ESG disclosure as a basis for decision making because
firms that disclose ESG disclosure will give
a good signal to investors. Second, research
opportunities on ESG disclosure are also
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still wide open for academics. ESG disclosure can be examined based on data from
other research data providers such as
Bloomberg or Dow Jones Sustainability
Index. ESG can also be examined by
dividing each ESG component (Environmental, Social, and Governance). Third,
firms can disclose ESG to gain a good
reputation from investors because firms that
disclose ESG disclosure will concern about
cost that will arise in the future in order to
reduce firm risk and regulators need to
make regulations that require firms to disclose mandatory ESG. This study has some
limitations. The CEO overconfidence
measurement is based on all samples; it
does not measure each country to compare
residual values from regression total asset
growth and total sales growth. ESG disclosure data in this study do not use disclosures
commonly used by investors, but the ESG
disclosure data were obtained from an
assessment based on Thomson Reuters.
Therefore, when taking data from other research data providers can have different research results. The data obtained also tends
to be few and the measurement for CEO
overconfidence and firm risk is based on
just one measurement.
Based on the limitations, this research
provides suggestions for further research.
Further research can analyze the firm risk
variables with other risk measures, such as
systematic risk or idiosyncratic risk. Future
research can develop this research with
samples of other countries such as in the
Middle East or East Asia Region and in a
longer period of time because more firms
will disclose ESG. Future research can
examine ESG disclosures by obtaining data
from other research data information such
as Bloomberg, the Dow Jones Sustainability
Index, and so on. Future studies can also
examine CEO overconfidence measurements based on each country per year.
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